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[485] 
Constitutional Limits on Evidentiary Forfeiture 
by Wrongdoing Among Conspirators 
Christopher Petroni* 
Four recent decisions in the federal courts of appeals have combined the evidentiary 
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing with imputed substantive criminal liability among 
conspirators under Pinkerton v. United States. According to this augmented rule—
called the “Cherry rule” after the Tenth Circuit opinion that first enunciated it—a 
witness’s out-of-court statement is admissible against a defendant if a co-conspirator 
wrongfully silenced the witness in a manner that was within the scope and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy, and was reasonably foreseeable. This expansion of the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine is inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause for two reasons: it was not contemplated at early common law 
and it leads to forfeiture of the confrontation right based only on a pretrial 
determination of guilt. In addition, even if the Cherry rule were compatible with the 
Confrontation Clause, due process constrains its application short of Pinkerton’s logical 
extent. Courts should reject or limit the Cherry rule accordingly. 
 
 * B.S., 2005, Montana State University; J.D., 2013, University of California Hastings College of 
the Law. Thanks to Professor Rory Little for the edits and encouragement.  
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Introduction 
Efforts to prosecute criminal conspiracies encounter a persistent 
obstacle: the objects of prosecution will coerce, threaten, and even kill 
witnesses to keep them away from court. The doctrine of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing evolved to combat this practice. In the federal system, when 
a criminal defendant (or any party to any federal litigation, civil or 
criminal) acts wrongfully to silence a witness, the witness’s out-of-court 
statements will be admissible against the defendant.1 Federal courts have 
adapted the doctrine to the frequent situations where a conspiracy 
defendant was complicit in witness tampering behind the scenes, but not 
directly responsible for the wrongful conduct itself.2 
In 2000, the Tenth Circuit expanded the scope of the federal 
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine by incorporating the theory of co-
conspirator liability set out in Pinkerton v. United States into the 
doctrine.3 The Fourth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits later followed suit.4 
Under this approach—commonly referred to as the Cherry rule after the 
case in which it was first adopted—a witness’s statement is admissible 
against a defendant if a co-conspirator wrongfully and intentionally made 
the witness unavailable, that wrongful act was within the scope and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy, and the act was reasonably foreseeable.5 
The federal forfeiture-by-wrongdoing provision, codified as Federal 
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), acts as an exception not only to the 
exclusion of hearsay, but also to the right to confront witnesses.6 The 
Cherry rule is also an exception to the confrontation right.7 Cherry, 
however, is inconsistent with the modern understanding of the 
Confrontation Clause. First, the Supreme Court has restricted the scope 
of any exceptions to the Clause to how common law courts understood 
them at the time the Sixth Amendment was ratified. As far as the 
common law courts’ application of the forfeiture doctrine can be 
measured from a remote, modern vantage point, they do not appear to 
 
 1. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). 
 2. See, e.g., United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a defendant 
forfeits the right to object to admission of a witness’s statement if he was involved in the witness’s murder 
“through knowledge, complicity, planning or in any other way”); Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d 421, 429 (8th 
Cir. 1982) (concluding that a defendant or “someone acting on his behalf” may forfeit the defendant’s 
objections to a witness’s out-of-court statements by making the witness unavailable). 
 3. See United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000) (“We therefore hold that a co-
conspirator may be deemed to have ‘acquiesced in’ the wrongful procurement of a witness’s unavailability 
for purposes of Rule 804(b)(6) and the waiver by misconduct doctrine when the government can satisfy 
the requirements of Pinkerton [v. United States], 328 U.S. [640, 647–48 (1946)].”). 
 4. United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 385 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 
336, 364 & n.24 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 963–64 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 5. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820. 
 6. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006); see also Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 360 (2008). 
 7. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820. 
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have imputed forfeiture by wrongdoing among co-conspirators.8 Second, 
as the Court observed of a California forfeiture statute in Giles v. 
California, admitting statements against defendants under the Cherry rule 
amounts to stripping them of the confrontation right based on a pretrial 
determination of guilt.9 
Further, the Cherry rule fuses Rule 804(b)(6) with the Pinkerton 
doctrine, which has been criticized as overbroad since its adoption in 
1946. Several circuit courts have restricted the breadth of Pinkerton’s 
application under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. As the 
Cherry rule incorporates the Pinkerton doctrine wholesale, any and all 
due process limits on Pinkerton should apply to Cherry as well. 
Part I of this Article summarizes the relevant law. Part II explains 
why the Cherry rule is inconsistent with the Confrontation Clause, both 
because an analog apparently did not exist at common law and because 
Cherry premises forfeiture of the confrontation right on a pretrial 
determination of guilt. Part III surveys criticism of Pinkerton more 
generally in order to measure the permissible scope of its application, 
and therefore, of its incorporation into the Cherry rule. Part III also 
examines courts of appeals decisions concluding that due process 
restrains the scope of vicarious liability under Pinkerton. Finally, Part III 
applies those due process restraints to the Cherry rule. 
In short, the Cherry rule violates the Confrontation Clause, and 
even if it does not, due process requires that its application be restricted. 
Courts should abandon or limit it accordingly. 
I.  The Relevant Law 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . . 
—U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
This Part first examines how Crawford v. Washington defined the 
modern contours of the Confrontation Clause. Second, it addresses 
Giles, in which the Supreme Court applied Crawford’s lens to the 
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. Third, it summarizes the Tenth 
Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Cherry. Finally, it examines the 
 
 8. Commentators have sharply criticized the Supreme Court’s historical analysis of the forfeiture-
by-wrongdoing doctrine. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (observing that “the 
early cases on the exception were not calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow question here”); id. 
at 390–98 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding that “no case limits forfeiture” as Justice Scalia’s opinion for the 
Court suggested); Adrienne Rose, Note, Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Post-Giles: Whether a Co-
Conspirator’s Misconduct Can Forfeit a Defendant’s Right to Confront Witnesses, 14 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & 
Pub. Pol’y 281, 31213 & nn.17172 (2011) (summarizing academic criticism of the Court’s analysis). 
Questions of reliability aside, the Court’s historical approach to the Confrontation Clause is the law, and 
the historical reasoning that the Court followed in Giles also calls for rejecting the Cherry rule. 
 9. Giles, 554 U.S. at 365. 
Petroni_18 (EGK).DOC (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2015 4:25 PM 
February 2015]                     LIMITS ON EVIDENTIARY FORFEITURE 489 
opinions of other circuits that have adopted the Cherry rule after Giles 
and in particular, the Fourth Circuit’s attempt to reconcile Cherry with 
the Giles court’s interpretation of the forfeiture doctrine. 
A. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON Tied the Scope of the Confrontation 
Clause to Its Historical Application 
Until 2004, the Confrontation Clause permitted admission of an out-
of-court statement against a criminal defendant only if it was sufficiently 
reliable, an inquiry that centered on whether the statement fell within a 
“‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or b[ore] ‘particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.’”10 In Crawford, the Supreme Court concluded that 
determining an out-of-court statement’s admissibility based on its reliability 
was inconsistent with the Confrontation Clause’s original meaning.11 
Noting that the “principal evil” against which the Clause was directed 
was the use of ex parte witness examinations against defendants, the 
Court adopted a categorical approach: statements that are “testimonial” are 
strictly inadmissible unless the declarant was unavailable and was subject 
to cross-examination on a prior occasion, while nontestimonial statements 
do not implicate the Confrontation Clause at all.12 The Court allowed for 
exceptions to the categorical exclusion of testimonial statements, but 
only those that were “established at the time of the founding.”13 
Forfeiture by wrongdoing is such an exception.14 
B. GILES V. CALIFORNIA Limited the Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing 
Exception to Its Historical Understanding 
In Giles, the Supreme Court held that a California statute setting 
out a hearsay exception for forfeiture by wrongdoing was inconsistent 
with the Confrontation Clause.15 The California exception provided for 
admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements against a defendant who 
 
 10. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 50–54. 
 13. Id. at 54. 
 14. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 360 (2008); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 (2006); 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. As the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine (and Rule 804(b)(6), which 
codifies it, Giles, 554 U.S. at 367; Davis, 547 U.S. at 833) is an exception to the confrontation right, 
Crawford’s distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements is irrelevant to the scope of 
the doctrine’s application. Testimonial statements by intentionally silenced witnesses are admissible 
under the doctrine, and nontestimonial statements are similarly admissible under the hearsay 
exception in Rule 804(b)(6). On the other hand, the restriction of the scope of the Clause to its 
historical application is highly relevant, because it ties the modern interpretation of the forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing doctrine to its application in 1791. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 358 (“We therefore ask whether 
the theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing accepted by the California Supreme Court is a founding-era 
exception to the confrontation right.”). 
 15. Giles, 554 U.S. at 353, 377. 
Petroni_18 (EGK).DOC (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2015 4:25 PM 
490 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:485 
harmed or threatened to harm the declarant, without any requirement 
that the defendant intended to make the declarant unavailable.16 Justice 
Scalia’s opinion for a plurality of the Court first noted that forfeiture by 
wrongdoing was recognized as an exception to the confrontation right 
when the Sixth Amendment was ratified, as Crawford requires.17 Justice 
Scalia examined early common law cases applying the forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing exception and concluded that the language the decisions 
used implied that the purpose of the defendant’s wrongful conduct must 
have been to make the witness unavailable.18 He buttressed this 
interpretation with several English and early American murder cases in 
which the victims’ statements were offered against the defendant.19 In 
each of these cases, the statements were admitted only if the defendant 
had a previous opportunity to confront the victim or if they qualified as 
dying declarations.20 Justice Scalia reasoned that if, as the modern 
California statute provided, proof of intent to silence the witness was not 
required to show forfeiture by wrongdoing, the prosecutors would have 
sought to introduce the statements on that basis.21 Recalling from 
Crawford that only those exceptions to the confrontation right that were 
“established at the time of the founding” may limit the scope of the right 
today, the Court held that this inferred common law requirement of a 
design “to prevent a witness from testifying” applies today as well.22 
This historical reasoning won over only a plurality of the Court, 
perhaps because the murder cases on which the plurality relied are too 
slender a reed to support its sweeping conclusion. The two concurring 
justices concluded that the early cases cited by the plurality “were not 
calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow question” of whether 
specific intent to silence the witness was required to invoke the forfeiture 
doctrine.23 The three dissenting justices were puzzled at how the plurality 
inferred the existence of a common law principle from the absence of 
examples to the contrary, rather than affirmative evidence that early 
courts recognized it.24 They developed a different explanation for the 
prosecutors’ failure to introduce the victim’s statements in early murder 
cases: whether or not the defendant’s purpose was to prevent the victim’s 
testimony, the statements would be admissible only if the defendant had 
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.25 In those cases where the 
 
 16. Id. at 357. 
 17. Id. at 359 (citing, e.g., Lord Morley’s Case, (1666) 6 How. St. Tr. 769 (H.L.) 771 (Eng.)). 
 18. Id. at 359–61. 
 19. Id. at 362–64. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 367. 
 22. Id. at 358, 368 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)). 
 23. Id. at 379–80 (Souter, J., concurring in part). 
 24. Id. at 393 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. at 394–95. 
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prosecutor did not offer the statements, the defendant had not had this 
opportunity, and therefore, any attempt to introduce them would have 
been pointless.26 Regardless of the persuasiveness of the plurality’s 
historical reasoning, however, the dissent did not dispute that, under 
Crawford, the scope of the confrontation right remains tethered to its 
“metes and bounds” in 1791.27 
C. GILES Also Held That Forfeiture May Not Be Premised Merely 
on a Pretrial Determination of Probable Guilt 
A majority of the Court identified another reason for invalidating 
the California forfeiture statute: it premised a finding of forfeiture on 
nothing more than a pretrial determination that the defendant was 
probably guilty of the wrongful act that silenced the witness.28 The Court 
reasoned that “[t]he notion that judges may strip the defendant of a right 
that the Constitution deems essential to a fair trial, on the basis of a prior 
judicial assessment that the defendant is guilty as charged, does not sit 
well with the right to trial by jury.”29 Similarly, Justice Souter reasoned 
that “[i]f the victim’s prior statement were admissible solely because the 
defendant kept the witness out of court by committing homicide, 
admissibility of the victim’s statement to prove guilt would turn on 
finding the defendant guilty of the homicidal act causing the absence.”30 
In other words, a finding that the defendant forfeited her right to 
confront the witness would rest on a pretrial determination that the 
defendant was probably guilty of the wrongful act that silenced the 
witness.31 “Equity demands something more than this near circularity 
before the right to confrontation is forfeited, and more is supplied by 
showing intent to prevent the witness from testifying.”32 
D. The Tenth Circuit in CHERRY Extended PINKERTON Liability to 
Evidentiary Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Under Rule 804(b)(6), 
Before CRAWFORD and GILES 
In Pinkerton, the Supreme Court held that a defendant is liable for a 
substantive crime of a co-conspirator if the crime is (1) within the scope 
and in furtherance of the conspiracy and (2) reasonably foreseeable.33 In 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 383. For more critical analysis of the Giles plurality’s historical reasoning, see Rose, 
supra note 8, at 313 nn.17172. 
 28. Giles, 554 U.S. at 365 (majority opinion); id. at 379 (Souter, J., concurring in part). 
 29. Id. at 365 (majority opinion) (emphasis in original). 
 30. Id. at 379 (Souter, J., concurring in part). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. 328 U.S. 640, 64748 (1946). Justice Douglas’s opinion for the majority stated these elements 
not in the conjunctive, but in the disjunctive: 
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2000, the Tenth Circuit applied the Pinkerton co-conspirator liability 
principle in a context that Pinkerton itself did not anticipate: forfeiture 
by wrongdoing under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6).34 Rule 
804(b)(6) provides that an out-of-court statement is admissible “against a 
party who wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the 
declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.”35 
Under the Tenth Circuit’s rule (the “Cherry rule”), a defendant is 
deemed to have forfeited her right to confront a witness if a co-
conspirator procured the witness’s unavailability and “the wrongful 
procurement was in furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably 
foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of [the] conspiracy.”36 
In Cherry, five defendants were charged with involvement in a drug 
conspiracy.37 The district court found that one of the defendants had 
murdered a government informant, and held that the informant’s out-of-
court statements38 were admissible against the killer, but not her co-
conspirators, under Rule 804(b)(6).39 The district court found that the co-
conspirators had not forfeited their hearsay and confrontation objections 
to the informant’s statements because no evidence suggested that they 
were responsible for killing the informant.40 On interlocutory appeal, the 
 
A different case would arise if the substantive offense committed by one of the conspirators 
was not in fact done in furtherance of the conspiracy, did not fall within the scope of the 
unlawful project, or was merely a part of the ramifications of the plan which could not be 
reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement. 
Id. However, if liability will not be imputed among co-conspirators if any one of the elements is not 
present, this necessarily implies that all elements must be present in order for imputed liability to 
attach. Lower courts have since applied the Pinkerton rule to require that the substantive criminal act 
is within the scope and in furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable. E.g., United 
States v. Min, 704 F.3d 314, 324 n.9 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 71 (2d Cir. 
2012); United States v. Madrid, 495 F. App’x 427, 430 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lopez-
Zamoran, 494 F. App’x 802, 804 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Smith, 697 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2012); United States v. Irvin, 682 F.3d 
1254, 1274 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Norman, 465 F. App’x 110, 117 n.10 (3d Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Elder, 682 F.3d 1065, 1073 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Diaz, 670 F.3d 332, 342 (1st Cir. 
2012); United States v. Lopez, 403 F. App’x 362, 37778 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Adkins, 372 
F. App’x 647, 650–51 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 34. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 35. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). 
 36. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820. 
 37. Id. at 813. 
 38. The Tenth Circuit did not describe the statements that the government sought to introduce, 
saying no more than that it “moved to admit out-of-court statements by [the informant].” Id. at 813. The 
nature or scope of the statements is irrelevant under Rule 804(b)(6), however, because misconduct 
intended to silence a witness amounts to total forfeiture of the right to object to introduction of the 
witness’s statements on hearsay and confrontation grounds. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) advisory committee’s 
note (1997); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 367 (2008); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006); 
Cherry, 217 F.3d at 815. 
 39. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 814. 
 40. Id. 
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government urged the Tenth Circuit to hold the statements admissible 
and rule that Pinkerton co-conspirator liability applies to the evidentiary 
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing rule.41 The court of appeals held that forfeiture 
under Rule 804(b)(6) may be imputed among co-conspirators, reasoning 
that Pinkerton liability strikes an “appropriate balance” between the 
defendant’s interest in confronting adverse witnesses and the justice 
system’s need to prevent witness tampering.42 The court therefore 
reversed the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to 
determine whether the informant’s murder was within the scope and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable.43 
Two years later, the Seventh Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit’s 
example and applied Pinkerton co-conspirator liability to the forfeiture-
by-wrongdoing exception in Rule 804(b)(6).44 
E. Subsequent Decisions by Circuit Courts Adopted the CHERRY 
Rule, Sometimes with Modification, After CRAWFORD and GILES 
Two circuit courts, the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Carson and 
the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Dinkins, adopted the Cherry rule 
after Crawford.45 The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Carson did not address 
whether the Supreme Court’s reinterpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause in Crawford had any effect on the scope or validity of the Cherry 
rule, devoting its reasoning on the question to a single footnote.46 The 
Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Dinkins, on the other hand, followed both 
Crawford and Giles and acknowledged that both required reexamination 
of the constitutional reach of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine.47 
Accordingly, it set out to square the Cherry rule with Giles’s intent 
requirement. 
Like the Tenth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit in Dinkins reasoned that 
importing co-conspirator liability under Pinkerton into the forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing doctrine would strike an “appropriate balance between” a 
defendant’s confrontation right and the public interest in preventing 
witness tampering.48 The court, therefore, adopted the Cherry rule in 
nearly the same terms as the Tenth Circuit: a witness’s statement is 
admissible against a defendant when her co-conspirator wrongfully 
 
 41. Id. at 813–16. 
 42. Id. at 820. 
 43. Id. at 821. 
 44. United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 96364 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 45. United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 385 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 
336, 364 & n.24 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 46. Carson, 455 F.3d at 364 n.24. The D.C. Circuit noted that the murdered witness’s statements were 
likely testimonial, but found the distinction to be “of no moment” because the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing 
exception applies to testimonial statements as well as nontestimonial statements. Id. at 363 n.22. 
 47. Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 382–84. 
 48. Id. at 384–85. 
Petroni_18 (EGK).DOC (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2015 4:25 PM 
494 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:485 
procured the witness’s unavailability, and “the wrongful procurement 
was in furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably foreseeable as a 
necessary or natural consequence of an ongoing conspiracy.”49 The court 
went on to observe, however, that the Supreme Court in Giles had 
“clarified that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception applies ‘only when 
the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from 
testifying.’”50 The Fourth Circuit reconciled Giles’s intent requirement 
with Cherry’s allowance of forfeiture based only on reasonable 
foreseeability by holding that a co-conspirator’s intentional misconduct that 
silences a witness will lead to forfeiture of a defendant’s right to confront 
that witness’s statements only if the government presents “evidence that the 
defendant ‘engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from 
testifying.’”51 
The Dinkins court went on to find that the facts of the case before it 
satisfied this modified Cherry rule.52 The defendant in Dinkins was 
incarcerated when his co-conspirators murdered an informant.53 He had, 
however, attempted to kill the same informant in the past, and 
announced an intent to “go to the hospital and finish him off.”54 The 
Fourth Circuit found that the defendant’s prior attempt on the 
informant’s life made his successful murder by co-conspirators 
reasonably foreseeable as required by Cherry.55 Similarly, the court 
reasoned, the prior attempt showed evidence, on the defendant’s part, of 
a “design” to make the informant unable to testify, as required by 
Giles.56 
Contrary to the observations of some commentators, Dinkins’s 
attempt to square Cherry and Giles must be regarded a failure.57 If the 
defendant must have personally intended to silence a witness, merely 
that she should reasonably have foreseen a co-conspirator’s wrongful 
attempt to do so is insufficient by definition. The Fourth Circuit’s 
application of its refined Cherry rule illustrates the problem. The 
defendant in Dinkins attempted to kill the informant with the purpose of 
making him unavailable, and when the attempt failed, announced to his 
co-conspirators the necessity of “finish[ing] the job.”58 The defendant’s 
 
 49. Id. at 385. 
 50. Id. at 383 (quoting Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008) (emphasis in original)). 
 51. Id. at 385 (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 359) (emphasis omitted). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 386. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Ruth A. Moyer, Comment, Setting Critical Limits on the Cherry Doctrine: The 
Fourth Circuit Decision in United States v. Dinkins, 64 S.C. L. Rev. 1117, 1127 (2013) (“[T]he Dinkins 
court adeptly reconciled the Cherry doctrine with the fundamental intent requirement of Giles.”). 
 58. Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 385. 
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prior attempt on the witness’s life showed that he personally intended to 
prevent the informant from testifying against him and his co-
conspirators. That the killing he personally set in motion was reasonably 
foreseeable to him played no practical role in the court’s analysis. In 
other words, inserting an intent requirement into the Cherry rule 
rendered the foreseeability of the co-conspirators’ actions superfluous. 
Put another way, the Dinkins court’s version of the Cherry rule is 
akin to a criminal statute that simultaneously requires both intent and 
negligence with regard to the proscribed result. The criminal law 
generally recognizes that intent is a more culpable mental state than that 
required for negligence, where reasonable foreseeability is key.59 The 
Dinkins rule requires that the defendant, against whom the witness’s 
statement is offered, harbor both intent and negligence with regard to 
the act that procured the witness’s unavailability. A defendant who 
should reasonably have foreseen that her co-conspirator would silence a 
witness, that is, who harbored the less culpable mental state of 
negligence, will not fall under the Dinkins rule unless she also harbored 
the more culpable mental state of intent that the witness be silenced. 
Inclusion of the more culpable mental state renders the less culpable one 
purposeless. 
To say that the Dinkins court failed to reconcile the Cherry rule 
with Giles’s intent requirement is not to say that the two are necessarily 
incompatible. As will be taken up in the next Part, recent commentators 
have reached opposing conclusions on this question. This Article does 
not propose a solution to the controversy, but concludes that the Cherry 
rule is inconsistent with the Confrontation Clause for other reasons. 
II.  The CHERRY Rule Is Inconsistent with the Confrontation 
Clause Under CRAWFORD and GILES 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Giles was announced, 
commentators have asked whether its requirement that the defendant 
acted with the intent to make the witness unavailable can be reconciled 
with the Cherry rule. One commentator argues that the Court’s decision 
in Giles precludes imputed forfeiture under Cherry because a “design to 
prevent the witness from testifying” cannot be imputed from one 
conspirator to another.60 This conclusion is based on the Giles Court’s 
 
 59. For example, of the Model Penal Code’s four mental states, purpose (equivalent to intent) is 
the most culpable and negligence the least. Model Penal Code §§ 1.13(12), 2.02(2), 2.02(5), 2.02 cmt. 
(2001). Under the Model Penal Code, a defendant was negligent if her failure to perceive a risk that 
the proscribed result would occur was “a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable 
person would observe in the actor’s situation.” Id. § 2.02(2)(d). 
 60. See Rose, supra note 8, at 318. In a similar vein, the Fourth Circuit apparently assumed that 
Giles did not allow for imputation among conspirators of a “design[] to prevent the witness from 
testifying.” Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 385. 
Petroni_18 (EGK).DOC (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2015 4:25 PM 
496 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:485 
historical analysis and its reliance on the common law maxim that “no 
one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.”61 
Another author reaches the opposite conclusion: Giles and the 
Cherry rule can coexist in harmony because one conspirator’s intent to 
prevent a witness’s testimony may be imputed to her co-conspirators.62 
The Giles Court itself did not direct lower courts not to impute one 
conspirator’s “design to prevent a witness from testifying” to another.63 
The majority did, according to the author, explain that the factual 
context will affect whether a court may infer that a defendant intended to 
render a witness unavailable.64 In particular, the Court addressed cases of 
domestic violence, in which trial courts might infer from patterns of past 
abuse that the abuser intended to isolate the victim from potential 
avenues for relief.65 Similarly, a court may permissibly infer from the 
collective efforts of a criminal conspiracy to foster a reputation for 
violent retaliation against “snitches” that one conspirator’s intent to 
silence a particular witness should be imputed to her fellows.66 Other 
criminal doctrines, in which intent is imputed by operation of law, such as 
transferred intent, felony murder, and even substantive liability under 
Pinkerton where intent is an element of the crime, further suggest that 
intent may be imputed for forfeiture purposes.67 Finally, the author 
asserts that the Cherry rule is perfectly consistent with the forfeiture 
doctrine’s aims of stripping defendants of the benefits of their 
wrongdoing and of deterring future witness tampering.68 
This Article does not attempt to resolve the controversy that these 
commentators raise. Whether Giles’s central holding permits courts to 
impute intent to prevent a witness’s testimony among conspirators, the 
Cherry rule is inconsistent with the Confrontation Clause for two 
unrelated reasons: (1) imputation of forfeiture by wrongdoing among 
conspirators was unknown to the common law when the Sixth 
Amendment was ratified; and (2) the Cherry rule premises forfeiture on 
a pretrial determination of the defendant’s guilt. 
 
 61. Rose, supra note 8, at 314 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159 (1878)). 
 62. Nathaniel Koslof, Note, Cherry Still on Top: How Pinkerton Concepts Continue to Govern 
Co-Conspirator Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Post-Giles, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 301, 327–28 (2014). 
 63. Id. at 317–18 (citing Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 377 (2008)). 
 64. Id. at 320. 
 65. Giles, 554 U.S. at 377. 
 66. Koslof, supra note 62, at 320–21. 
 67. Id. at 321–23. 
 68. Id. at 324–26. The Seventh Circuit also relied, in part, on this deterrence rationale when it 
adopted the Cherry rule. United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 965 (7th Cir. 2002). It went on to 
reject the argument that the Cherry rule permits one conspirator to be stripped of the confrontation 
right involuntarily based on the wrongful conduct of another. Id. (citing Cherry, 217 F.3d at 823 
(Holloway, J., dissenting)). The Court reasoned that the Cherry rule is tied to the defendant’s 
intentional, wrongful conduct in participating in an illegal conspiracy, where wrongful action against a 
witness is reasonably foreseeable. Id. 
Petroni_18 (EGK).DOC (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2015 4:25 PM 
February 2015]                     LIMITS ON EVIDENTIARY FORFEITURE 497 
A.  Imputed Forfeiture Among Conspirators Did Not Exist at the 
Time the Sixth Amendment Was Ratified 
The crime of conspiracy was first enacted in England in the 
fourteenth century, and was well established in the United States by the 
end of the eighteenth.69 When conspiracy was charged against a 
defendant, acts of co-conspirators taken in pursuit of the conspiracy were 
imputed to the defendant for the purpose of establishing the conspiracy’s 
existence.70 However, the Author has been unable to uncover a case 
prior to the twentieth century in which a conspirator was deemed 
criminally liable for her co-conspirator’s actions, apart from her liability 
for the crime of conspiracy. It appears that American courts did not 
begin imputing substantive criminal liability among conspirators until the 
twentieth century, and the Supreme Court did not adopt the principle 
until Pinkerton in 1946.71 
Early common law treatises discuss the forfeiture rule without 
mentioning forfeiture based on a co-conspirator’s conduct. For example, 
Phillips & Amos wrote that a witness’s deposition was deemed 
admissible against a defendant at trial if the witness was “kept away by 
the practices” of the defendant.72 The treatise did not mention that a 
defendant could be deemed to have forfeited any objection to admitting 
the deposition if a co-conspirator kept the witness away.73 Similarly, an 
1801 edition of Gilbert’s Law of Evidence provided that a coroner’s 
examination of a witness would be admissible at trial if “the witness [was] 
 
 69. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *136 (describing the statutory crime of conspiracy 
to falsely indict); Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 393, 395–96 (1922); see also 
Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 924, 931 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 5127); Gardner v. Preston, 2 Day 205, 20910 
(Conn. 1805); People v. Barrett, 1 Johns. 66, 75–76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806); Lambert v. People, 9 Cow. 
578, 624 (N.Y. 1827); Cornwell v. State, 8 Tenn. (Mart. & Yer.) 147, 147 (Tenn. 1827). 
 70. Cornwell, 8 Tenn. (Mart. & Yer.) at 147; Gardner, 2 Day at 210 (citing 1 Edward H. East, A 
Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown § 38 (1803)). 
 71. Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 922, 993–94 (1959) 
[hereinafter Developments]; Note, Vicarious Liability for Criminal Offenses of Co-Conspirators, 
56 Yale L.J. 371, 376 (1947) [hereinafter Vicarious Liability]. California courts held defendants liable 
for the substantive crimes of co-conspirators “committed as a part of the conspiracy” before 
Pinkerton. See Anderson v. Superior Court, 177 P.2d 315, 317 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947). Anderson in 
turn cited a number of pre-Pinkerton cases for that proposition. See People v. Kauffman, 92 P. 861, 
862 (Cal. 1907) (noting that all parties who “conspire or combine together to commit any unlawful act” 
are criminally liable for all acts by co-conspirators which are “probable and natural consequences” of 
the conspiracy); People v. Welch, 264 P. 324, 327 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928) (describing as “well-
settled” the principle that criminal liability for acts committed “during the life of the conspiracy and in 
the furtherance of [its] accomplishment” is imputed among all conspirators); People v. Murphy, 200 P. 
484, 488 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (“The established rule is that when a conspiracy to commit an 
offense of a certain class is shown each conspirator is deemed guilty of every such crime committed in 
furtherance of the conspiracy by any of the conspirators.”). 
 72. Samuel March Phillipps & Andrew Amos, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 576 (8th 
ed. 1838) (citation omitted). 
 73. Id. at 57677. 
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detained and kept back from appearing by the means and procurement 
of the prisoner.”74 No mention is made of whether the witness’s 
examination would be similarly admissible against the defendant’s co-
conspirators. Neither treatise, however, addresses the question 
specifically. 
In contrast, at least one English case discusses whether a witness’s 
out-of-court statement would be admissible against the co-conspirators 
of the defendant who wrongfully silenced the witness.75 In R v. Scaife, 
the Crown sought to introduce a witness’s statements against three 
defendants charged with robbery.76 The evidence showed that only one 
defendant was responsible for procuring the witness’s unavailability.77 
The trial court allowed the statements to be read before the jury.78 On 
appeal, the Court of Queen’s Bench considered the argument that the 
deposition was properly admitted against all defendants because they 
acted in combination in the charged felony.79 However, the Court held 
that the statements were not admissible against all of the defendants 
because only one was shown to have been responsible for preventing the 
witness from testifying.80 
Scaife cautions modern courts against imputing forfeiture of the 
confrontation right among co-conspirators in the same manner as the 
murder cases that Justice Scalia examined in Giles, and it supports the 
conclusion more strongly than those cases. Justice Scalia reasoned that if 
the early common law provided that a defendant forfeited any objection 
to a witness’s statement merely by causing the witness’s unavailability, 
prosecutors would have sought to introduce a murder victim’s statement 
against the defendant on that theory.81 That prosecutors did not do so 
demonstrates that a defendant was not deemed to forfeit the 
confrontation right absent intent to make the witness unavailable.82 
Unlike the cases that Justice Scalia examined in Giles, in Scaife the 
Crown attempted to invoke the theory of forfeiture in question: it 
attempted to introduce the statement of the silenced witness against all 
of the codefendants, not merely the defendant responsible for keeping 
 
 74. Geoffrey Gilbert, The Law of Evidence 125 (James Sedgwick ed., 6th ed. 1801). Justice 
Scalia cited similar language appearing in a 1756 edition of Gilbert on Evidence in Giles. Giles v. 
California, 554 U.S. 353, 365 (2008) (citing Geoffrey Gilbert, Law of Evidence 140–41 (1756)).  
 75. R v. Scaife, (1851) 117 Eng. Rep. 1271 (Q.B.). Scaife is among the cases that the majority and 
dissent in Giles cited in their respective discussions of the historical scope of the confrontation right. 
Giles, 554 U.S. at 359, 366–67 (majority opinion); id. at 38283 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 76. Scaife, 117 Eng. Rep. at 1271. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1273. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 362–64 (2008). 
 82. Id. 
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the witness away. The Court of Queen’s Bench expressly rejected that 
argument. The court’s affirmative rejection of the Crown’s invitation to 
impute one co-venturer’s forfeiture of the right to confront a witness to 
her co-conspirators demonstrates that the common law did not recognize 
imputed forfeiture. 
This argument, like the Court’s historical analysis in Giles, is not 
especially persuasive on its own. The absence of any discussion that 
forfeiture by wrongdoing was imputed among conspirators in the 
treatises mentioned above is compatible with the contention that the 
common law did not recognize such imputation, but these authorities are 
“not calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow question” of whether 
that contention is true.83 R v. Scaife is stronger evidence of the proposition, 
because the Court of Queen’s Bench affirmatively rejected the Crown’s 
argument that the witness’s statement should be admissible against the 
co-venturers of the defendant responsible for wrongfully silencing the 
witness. On the other hand, even this example is susceptible to Justice 
Souter’s ambivalence in Giles, because there was no accusation of 
conspiracy in Scaife, and therefore, co-conspirator imputation principles in 
particular were not implicated. The academic commentary, however, 
suggests that vicarious liability for substantive crimes did not become a 
feature of conspiracy law until the twentieth century; this also suggests 
that it did not exist at early common law.84 If the principle of imputed 
substantive liability among conspirators did not exist in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, then courts in those centuries could not have 
adopted that principle to impute forfeiture among conspirators as well. In 
combination, the treatises, case law example, and apparent lack of vicarious 
substantive liability among conspirators demonstrate that the Cherry rule 
has no analog in early common law. 
B.  The CHERRY Rule Allows for Forfeiture of the Confrontation 
Right Based on a Pretrial Determination of Guilt 
In Giles, the Supreme Court overturned a California forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing statute in part because it allowed a witness’s testimonial out-
of-court statements to be admitted as evidence that a defendant was 
guilty of murder based only on a pretrial finding that the defendant was 
probably guilty of murdering the witness.85 Six justices held that this 
provision for forfeiture of the confrontation right based on a pretrial 
 
 83. Giles, 554 U.S. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring in part). 
 84. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 85. Giles, 554 U.S. at 365; id. at 379 (Souter, J., concurring in part). 
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determination of guilt rendered the statute unconstitutional, while only 
four signed on to the Court’s historical analysis without reservation.86 
Like the California statute rejected in Giles, the Cherry rule 
premises forfeiture of the confrontation right on a pretrial determination 
of guilt. The Cherry rule adopts Pinkerton liability wholesale: a 
statement is admissible against a defendant if the defendant’s co-
conspirator’s wrongful act to silence a witness was within the scope and 
in furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable.87 Under the 
Cherry rule, then, if a witness’s statement is admissible against a 
defendant, the defendant would also be liable for any crime committed 
against the witness under Pinkerton. In other words, evidence of guilt 
would be admissible against the defendant based on a pretrial 
determination that the defendant is probably guilty of silencing the 
witness through the actions of her co-conspirator. As Justice Souter 
concluded in Giles, “[e]quity demands something more” than a bare, 
circular conclusion that the defendant is guilty: the defendant in 
particular must have acted with the purpose of making the witness 
unavailable.88 This “something more” is missing from the Cherry rule. 
Of course, other pretrial evidentiary questions frequently involve 
determinations that a defendant participated in a conspiracy, but these 
do not amount to a pretrial determination of guilt in the manner that the 
Cherry rule does. As a particular example, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence’s exclusion of co-conspirator statements from the hearsay rule 
requires proof that the statements were made “by a coconspirator of a 
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”89 This 
Rule, therefore, necessarily requires proof before trial that the defendant 
participated in a conspiracy. However, the admissibility of co-conspirator 
statements does not rest on the theory that the wrongful nature of the 
defendant’s conspiring amounts to forfeiture of any rights. Rather, the 
statements are deemed the statements of the defendant herself, and are 
therefore admissible as party admissions.90 “[T]heir admissibility in 
evidence is the result of the adversary system,” not of any finding that 
the defendant forfeited her confrontation right through criminal 
wrongdoing.91 
Rule 804(b)(6), unlike the exemption for co-conspirator statements, 
is quasi-criminal in nature. At the foundation of Anglo-American 
 
 86. See id. at 379 (explaining that the Court’s exposition of the danger that forfeiture might rest 
on a pretrial judicial determination of guilt, rather than the Court’s historical analysis, persuaded him 
to join the Court’s opinion). 
 87. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 88. Giles, 554 U.S. at 379 (Souter, J., concurring in part). 
 89. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). 
 90. Fed. R. Evid. 801 advisory committee’s note (1972). 
 91. Id. 
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criminal law is the notion that individuals may be compelled to 
compensate society for the public wrongs they commit through forfeiture 
of their liberty and property.92 Criminal law is also meant to prevent 
crime through the threefold goals of deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation.93 Weighty as these interests are, the high liberty costs that 
attend a conviction require the government to prove its case against a 
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.94 Rule 804(b)(6) functions in the 
same manner and has many of the same aims as the criminal law. As the 
criminal punishment, in some sense, repays society for deliberate harms 
worked against it, forfeiture by wrongdoing compensates somewhat for a 
defendant’s wrongful action against a witness by stripping that defendant 
of the benefits of her wrongdoing. Though the Rule may not incapacitate 
or rehabilitate wrongdoers, it aims to deter wrongful conduct.95 Each of 
these aims is accomplished by deeming the defendant to have forfeited 
her constitutionally recognized right to confront witnesses. As the Court 
recognized in Giles, to premise this forfeiture on nothing more than a 
determination before trial, out of the presence of the jury, and by a mere 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is probably guilty of 
whatever criminal act rendered the witness unavailable, is a burden that 
the Confrontation Clause cannot bear.96 The more stringent requirement 
set out in Giles ensures that forfeiture of the right to confront a witness 
will rest not on a pretrial determination of guilt, but on a showing that 
the defendant intended specifically to render the witness unavailable. 
III.  Even if the CHERRY Rule Does Not Offend the Confrontation 
Clause, Due Process Constrains Its Application Short of the 
Logical Extent of PINKERTON Co-Conspirator Liability 
The Pinkerton decision expanded the scope of federal conspiracy 
law to include liability for the substantive crimes of other conspirators. 
While some commentators have supported this extension, most have 
criticized it.97 In response to the shortcomings of the Pinkerton doctrine, 
 
 92. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *6. 
 93. Id. at *10–11. 
 94. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970). 
 95. E.g., United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 962 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cherry, 
217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 96. Fed. R. Evid. 804 advisory committee’s note. 
 97. See, e.g., Vicarious Liability, supra note 71, at 375; Developments, supra note 71, at 996; Paul 
Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from an Ever Expanding, Ever More Troubling 
Area, 1 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1, 7 n.28 (1992). The Model Penal Code rejected vicarious liability 
for reasonably foreseeable crimes by co-conspirators. See Model Penal Code § 2.06(3) (1962) 
(providing that complicity requires that the defendant have “the purpose of promoting or facilitating 
the commission of the offense”); Model Penal Code § 2.04(3) cmt. 2 (Tentative Drafts Nos. 14, 
1968) (noting that co-conspirator liability based on the probability of the substantive offense 
“predicate[s] the liability on negligence when, for good reason, more is normally required”). Many 
state court decisions have rejected Pinkerton as well. See State v. Stein, 27 P.3d 184, 189 (Wash. 2001) 
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many circuit courts have intimated that due process constrains the 
doctrine’s reach.98 Because the Cherry rule applies the Pinkerton 
doctrine to Rule 804(b)(6) wholesale, the due process concerns identified 
in Pinkerton apply with equal force to the Cherry rule. Accordingly, even 
if the Cherry rule may be applied consistently with the Confrontation 
Clause (as the Fourth Circuit attempted in Dinkins), the due process 
limitations that circuit courts have applied to constrain Pinkerton should 
constrain Cherry as well. 
A.  PINKERTON Allows for the Imputation of Substantive Liability 
for Co-Conspirators’ Crimes 
The U.S. Code presently defines conspiracy as the act of “two or 
more persons conspir[ing] either to commit any offense against the 
United States, or to defraud the United States.”99 This modern 
formulation and all other versions of the crime of conspiracy in effect in 
U.S. jurisdictions trace their origins to a statute enacted in England in 
1304 by Edward I.100 Originally, the crime of conspiracy applied only to 
agreements to bring a false indictment, though it expanded into 
agreements to commit any crime whatsoever in the seventeenth 
century.101 Indeed, in England and the United States, the crime swelled 
so far as to include agreements to commit any act the courts deemed 
immoral.102 
That the act of one conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy is 
considered the act of all was well settled at common law by the end of the 
eighteenth century, though case law did not provide for vicarious liability 
 
(en banc) (rejecting Pinkerton as “incompatible with Washington law” because it allows for complicity 
in a co-conspirator’s act without knowledge of it); State ex rel. Woods v. Cohen, 844 P.2d 1147, 1151 
(Ariz. 1992) (en banc) (concluding that Pinkerton is not within Arizona’s “statutory universe”); People v. 
McGee, 399 N.E.2d 1177, 1182 (N.Y. 1979) (“[I]t is repugnant to our system of jurisprudence, where guilt 
is generally personal to the defendant, to impose punishment, not for the socially harmful agreement to 
which the defendant is a party, but for substantive offenses in which he did not participate.”). 
 98. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 850 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 768 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 99. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2014). 
 100. Sayre, supra note 69, at 395–96 (citing Third Ordinance of Conspirators, 1304, 33 Edw. 1 (Eng.)). 
 101. Id. at 400. 
 102. Id. at 400–07. More recently, the Supreme Court determined that a state statute criminalizing 
conspiracies “to commit acts injurious to public morals” was likely unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad, but declined to find fault with criminalizing an agreement to commit an act that was not 
itself criminal. See Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 9798 (1948) (remanding to the Utah Supreme Court 
to determine whether the statute could be construed narrowly). The principle that a conspiracy is 
criminal even if its purpose is not is expressed in the federal conspiracy statute, which penalizes 
conspiracies to “defraud the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2014); Phillip E. Johnson, The 
Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1137, 1144–45 (1973). 
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for substantive crimes.103 Instead, by the first half of the twentieth 
century, federal courts had come to use the imputation principle 
(1) to establish as the act of all members of the alleged conspiracy the 
overt act required by the federal conspiracy statute, (2) to show the 
extent and duration of the conspiracy in relation to all the conspirators, 
or (3) as a rule of evidence to connect all the defendants with the crime 
charged.104 
Before 1946, federal courts declined to extend the theory of conspiracy 
to hold one conspirator liable for a substantive offense committed by 
another conspirator.105 
1.  Pinkerton Extended Co-Conspirator Liability to Substantive 
Crimes by Co-Conspirators That Were Not the Object of the 
Conspiracy 
The potential scope of criminal conspiracy law expanded 
considerably with the Supreme Court’s 1946 opinion in Pinkerton.106 
Walter and Daniel Pinkerton appealed from convictions for multiple 
counts of Internal Revenue Code violations, and one count each of 
conspiracy.107 Daniel argued that no evidence connected him to the 
substantive crimes in the indictment.108 In fact, he showed that he was 
serving time in a penitentiary when Walter committed some of the 
 
 103. East, supra note 70, at 97. The principle is stated in a chapter explaining the crime of high 
treason, but the text makes clear that it applied to all conspiracies. Id. at 96; see United States v. 
Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 469 (1827) (“Each [conspirator] is deemed to consent to, or 
command, what is done by any other in furtherance of the common object.”); Gardner v. Preston, 
2 Day 205, 210 (Conn. 1805) (one conspirator’s act in pursuit of the objective of the conspiracy is 
deemed the act of all conspirators). 
 104. Vicarious Liability, supra note 71, at 375; see id. at 375 nn.36–38 (collecting cases). Of course, 
at present, the rule that a statement by a conspirator within the scope and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy is admissible against all other conspirators is codified within the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). 
 105. Vicarious Liability, supra note 71, at 375; Developments, supra note 71, at 993–94. As noted 
in Developments, at the time that the Supreme Court decided Pinkerton, the Third Circuit had 
declined to hold that each participant in a conspiracy was liable for the substantive criminal acts of 
other conspirators. Id. at 994 (citing United States v. Sall, 116 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1940)). In Sall, the 
Third Circuit held that proof of the defendant’s membership in a conspiracy to conceal alcohol was not 
sufficient to show him substantively liable for the concealment itself: “It is the act of concealment with 
criminal intent, and not the previous agreement, which is the gist of that offense.” Sall, 116 F.2d at 747. 
The Pinkerton brothers relied on Sall for the proposition that participation in a conspiracy did not, on 
its own, render all conspirators vicariously liable for a single conspirator’s substantive crime. Brief for 
the Petitioners at 19–20, Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (No. 719). In rejecting Sall, 
the Supreme Court established throughout the federal courts for the first time that conspirators are 
vicariously liable for their co-conspirators’ criminal acts carried out in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 64647. 
 106. 328 U.S. at 640; see Vicarious Liability, supra note 71, at 373–74 (Pinkerton abolished the 
common law merger rule and provided that a conspirator may be liable for criminal acts of other 
conspirators). 
 107. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 641. 
 108. Id. at 645. 
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offenses.109 The Court held that Daniel’s mere participation in the 
conspiracy was enough to render him liable for all criminal acts by his co-
conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.110 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court summarized the principle that “an overt act of one 
partner may be the act of all.”111 Because the overt act required by the 
federal conspiracy statute could be supplied by the act of a co-
conspirator, the Court reasoned, “other acts in furtherance of the 
conspiracy” should also be attributed to all participants.112 
The Court recognized that the broad scope of conspiracy liability 
lent itself to abuses and potential injustice, even as it expanded that 
scope in Pinkerton.113 Perhaps in response to this potential, the Court 
suggested that a conspirator is liable for another conspirator’s 
substantive offense only if the offense was “in furtherance of the 
conspiracy” and “within the scope of the unlawful project.”114 The Court 
added an additional limitation: the offense must have been reasonably 
foreseeable “as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful 
agreement.”115 
2.  Justifications of the Pinkerton Rule Rest Primarily on a 
“General Partnership” Theory 
Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Court drew heavily on the notion 
that a conspiracy is a “partnership in crime.”116 Like partners in a 
business enterprise, Justice Douglas reasoned, each conspirator should 
be deemed responsible for each other conspirator’s actions within the 
scope of the conspiracy.117 For this principle, rather than citing opinions 
interpreting conspiracy law in general, Justice Douglas referred to 
antitrust cases involving incorporated business entities charged with 
 
 109. Id. at 648 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part). 
 110. Id. at 647. 
 111. Id. at 646 (citation omitted). 
 112. Id. at 647. 
 113. Id. at 644 n.4. The Court cited an observation by the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges in 
1925 that prosecutors often inject conspiracy charges into indictments in order to convert misdemeanors 
into felonies or to gain advantage of special rules of evidence that make conspiracy cases “difficult to try 
without prejudice to an innocent defendant.” Id. (quoting Resolutions of Conference of Senior Circuit 
Judges, 11 A.B.A. J. 453, 453 (1925)). The Court brushed these concerns aside, noting that it “[did] not 
find that practice reflected in this present case.” Id. Of course, the modern federal conspiracy statute 
provides that a conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor is also punished as a misdemeanor. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371 (2014). 
 114. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647–48. 
 115. Id. at 648. The Court did not affirmatively state that each of these elements is required, but 
merely suggested that it would face “[a] different case” if any of them were absent. Id. at 647–48. 
However, each circuit now requires that a conspirator’s substantive crime be within the scope and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable in order for other conspirators to be 
vicariously liable for it. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 116. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 644. 
 117. Id. at 646–47. 
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colluding to fix prices.118 Justice Douglas did not explain why the broad 
principle of vicarious liability for antitrust offenses, which by their nature 
include an element of collusion, should expand to encompass any 
substantive crime committed in furtherance of any conspiracy. 
Later commentators have expanded on the agency rationale in 
Pinkerton. As an agent of the principal, an accomplice (or co-conspirator) 
“is in agreement with the principal’s actions,” and “therefore worthy of 
punishment.”119 However, this agency rationale falters in the criminal 
context where a co-conspirator’s contribution is tenuous or insubstantial.120 
Similarly, in joining a conspiracy, a conspirator forfeits her personal 
autonomy, effectively saying, “your acts are my acts.”121 Holding this 
conspirator liable for her co-conspirators’ reasonably foreseeable acts is 
therefore permissible.122 
B.  Criticism of PINKERTON 
The first vigorous criticism of the Pinkerton rule followed on the 
majority opinion’s heels.123 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rutledge 
reminded the Court that Daniel Pinkerton was incarcerated when his 
brother carried out many of the substantive crimes, and no evidence 
suggested that Daniel aided in or even knew about them.124 The dissent 
invoked a number of “dangers for abuse” in the state of conspiracy law 
before Pinkerton, including “[t]he looseness with which the charge may 
be proved, the almost unlimited scope of vicarious responsibility for 
others’ acts which follows once agreement is shown, [and] the 
psychological advantages of such trials for securing convictions by 
attributing to one proof against another.”125 Expanding the scope of 
conspiracy liability to include substantive offenses in furtherance of the 
conspiracy exacerbates these dangers.126 Justice Rutledge also took issue 
with the Court’s reliance on “private commercial law” to expand the 
 
 118. Id. at 644 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 166–67 (1940) (oil 
companies charged with conspiring to fix gasoline prices)); id. at 647 (citing United States v. Kissel, 
218 U.S. 601, 605–06 (1910) (lender charged with conspiring with sugar company to lend money in 
exchange for a controlling share of a rival sugar company)). 
 119. Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional Crimes: Remaining Within the 
Constraints of Intent, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1351, 135556 n.13 (1998) (citing Joshua Dressler, 
Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old 
Problem, 37 Hastings L.J. 91, 110 (1985)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Dressler, supra note 119, at 111. 
 122. Kimberly R. Bird, Note, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine: “Your Acts Are 
My Acts!”, 34 W. St. U. L. Rev. 43, 49 (2006). 
 123. See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 648 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 650. 
 126. Id. 
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vicarious liability of business partners into “the criminal field.”127 To 
Justice Rutledge, guilt of a crime “remains personal, not vicarious.”128 
Justice Jackson, a former Attorney General, added to Justice 
Rutledge’s concerns in his concurring opinion in Krulewitch v. United 
States.129 Justice Jackson devoted much of his opinion to expounding the 
abuses of conspiracy law in general, particularly the incentives it gives 
prosecutors to rely on it excessively and the dangers of prejudice it poses 
to defendants.130 He saved specific criticisms for the Court’s holding in 
Pinkerton, however.131 Like Justice Rutledge, Justice Jackson observed 
that Pinkerton allows a conspirator to suffer conviction of a substantive 
crime, effectively becoming an aider or abettor, despite no evidence that 
he had control over or even knew of its commission.132 
Many commentators have noticed that Pinkerton allows for 
conviction of a serious crime based not on a finding of whatever mental 
state the crime requires, but on mere negligence.133 The phrase 
“reasonably foreseeable” invokes the “reasonable person” of tort 
liability, and implies a broader scope of foreseeable consequences than 
does a requirement of intent or knowledge.134 In effect, Pinkerton 
renders a conspirator criminally liable for any crime that she “should 
have known” her co-conspirators might commit; that is, if she was 
negligent with regard to its likelihood.135 In basing liability on mere 
negligence, Pinkerton punishes “a conspirator who never agreed to, 
aided, or participated in, the commission of the collateral offense.”136 
 
 127. Id. at 651–52. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice 
Jackson served as Attorney General from 1940 to 1941, when he was appointed to the Supreme Court 
to replace Justice Hughes. Jeffrey D. Hockett, New Deal Justice: The Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of Hugo L. Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert h. Jackson 23536 (1996). He 
took no part in the decision in Pinkerton. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 648. 
 130. Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 445–46, 452–54 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 131. Id. at 451. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 71, at 996; Marcus, supra note 97, at 7 n.28. 
 134. Developments, supra note 71, at 996. 
 135. Marcus, supra note 97, at 7 n.28. 
 136. Id. When early drafts of the Model Penal Code rejected Pinkerton-style co-conspirator 
liability, among the reasons given in the comments was Pinkerton’s provision for liability for serious 
crimes based on a showing of nothing more than negligence. Model Penal Code § 2.04(3) cmt. 2 
(Tentative Drafts Nos. 1–4, 1968). Of course, negligence itself is the requisite mental state for some 
substantive crimes, such as negligent homicide. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 210.4 (1985). For a 
negligent crime, to hold a conspirator liable based on the reasonable foreseeability that a co-
conspirator would commit it might not seem incongruous. However, the negligence proscribed in, say, 
negligent homicide statutes is not the negligence that Pinkerton contemplates. A negligent homicide 
statute targets deviations from the standard of care that a reasonable person would take with regard to 
the risk of inadvertently causing death. See id. § 210.4 explanatory note (definition of negligent 
homicide); id. § 2.02(2)(d) (definition of “negligently”). Pinkerton charges conspirators with liability in 
any reasonably foreseeable crime by a co-conspirator. The Model Penal Code rejected its application 
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The bulk of Pinkerton’s criticism has rested on the broad scope of 
its application. Punishing one conspirator for the substantive crime of 
another, particularly a serious one, based on nothing more than 
membership in the same conspiracy leads to serious proportionality 
problems.137 A defendant’s only defenses to a co-conspirator’s 
substantive crime will be that the crime does not satisfy the elements of 
Pinkerton or that the defendant withdrew from the conspiracy before the 
crime was committed.138 The potential scope of a conspiracy and the acts 
that might be “in furtherance” of it are so broad, however, that few 
criminal acts by co-conspirators will fall outside them.139 Withdrawal is 
also difficult to prove, because it requires evidence of an affirmative act 
to defeat the object of the conspiracy;140 mere inaction will not suffice.141 
C.  The Eleventh and Ninth Circuits Have Concluded That Due 
Process Limits the Reach of Vicarious Liability Under PINKERTON 
As the Pinkerton rule grew in popularity among state and federal 
prosecutors in the 1970s, federal courts began to address their concerns 
with its breadth in terms of due process limits.142 The first decisions to 
suggest a due process limit to vicarious liability of conspirators did so 
vaguely and in passing, implying that Pinkerton itself may represent a 
due process “floor.”143 In later decisions, several circuits began to 
expound the idea that due process constrains Pinkerton’s application 
 
even to crimes of negligence, providing instead that a co-conspirator or accomplice “command[] or 
assist[] in performing the behavior that is reckless or negligent.” Model Penal Code § 2.04(3) cmt. 
n.28 (Tentative Drafts Nos. 1–4, 1968). 
 137. Joshua Dressler, The Jurisprudence of Death by Another: Accessories and Capital 
Punishment, 51 U. Colo. L. Rev. 17, 56 (1979). 
 138. Vicarious Liability, supra note 71, at 377–78. 
 139. Id. at 377. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines restrict the scope of Pinkerton somewhat by 
defining “relevant conduct” for the purpose of determining the base offense level to include “all 
reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal 
activity.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3 (2013). “Jointly undertaken criminal activity” 
in turn is defined not by the scope of the entire conspiracy, but only by the activity in which the 
individual defendant agreed to participate. Id. § 1B1.3 cmt. 2. The Sentencing Guidelines, of course, 
do not state principles of liability, and the comments to § 1B1.3 state that the principles that determine 
the applicable guideline range are not necessarily the same as those that determine when a defendant 
will be liable as a conspirator. Id. In any event, however, the Guidelines represent another example of 
retreat from Pinkerton. 
 140. Vicarious Liability, supra note 71, at 377–78 (citing Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369 
(1912)). At least one commentator has argued that this construction of the withdrawal defense is an 
unconstitutional shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant. Barton D. Day, Note, The 
Withdrawal Defense to Criminal Conspiracy: An Unconstitutional Allocation of the Burden of Proof, 
51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 420, 441 (1983). 
 141. Vicarious Liability, supra note 71, at 377. 
 142. Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of Pinkerton, 
57 Am. U. L. Rev. 585, 598 (2008). 
 143. Id. at 591, 599–602. 
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short of the doctrine’s logical extent.144 If the due process clauses restrain 
the extent to which conspirators may be held liable for their co-
conspirators’ crimes under Pinkerton, then they similarly restrain the 
extent of vicarious responsibility for acts of witness tampering under 
Cherry, which adopts Pinkerton wholesale. 
An example of an early case reading Pinkerton as a due process 
floor for co-conspirator liability is the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United 
States v. Decker.145 In Decker, two defendants appealed from their 
convictions under Pinkerton of drug-trafficking offenses committed by 
co-conspirators.146 The court endorsed the suggestion of a dissenting 
opinion in an earlier Fifth Circuit case that vicarious criminal liability 
“may raise obvious due process objections.”147 Nevertheless, the court 
upheld the conviction because the elements of Pinkerton were 
satisfied.148 This necessarily implies that the court found Pinkerton’s 
requirement of reasonable foreseeability sufficient to satisfy any due 
process concerns arising from vicarious criminal liability. Later Fifth 
Circuit decisions, as well as decisions from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 
have taken a similar view.149 
Courts began to move beyond treating Pinkerton merely as a due 
process floor for co-conspirator responsibility, and instead suggesting 
that Pinkerton itself violates due process when carried to its logical 
extent.150 In United States v. Alvarez, a drug trafficker killed a federal 
agent during an undercover buy-bust operation.151 Several conspirators 
were convicted of the murder under Pinkerton, and argued on appeal 
that the killing was so attenuated from the object of the conspiracy that 
the convictions violated due process.152 The Eleventh Circuit first noted 
three categories of crimes for which a co-conspirator may be found liable 
under Pinkerton. The first two are common subjects of Pinkerton 
convictions: substantive crimes that were already the object of the 
 
 144. Mark Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A “New” Due Process Limit on Pinkerton Conspiracy 
Liability, 33 Am. J. Crim. L. 91, 128–29, 142–43 (2006). 
 145. 543 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1976); see Kreit, supra note 142, at 600. 
 146. Decker, 543 F.2d at 1103. 
 147. Id. (citing Park v. Huff, 506 F.2d 849, 864 (5th Cir. 1975) (Thornburry, J., dissenting)). 
 148. Id. at 1104. 
 149. See United States v. Christian, 942 F.2d 363, 36768 (6th Cir. 1991) (concluding that defendants’ 
convictions under Pinkerton for firearm possession were supported by the reasonably foreseeable 
eventuality that guns will be carried or used during drug deals, and therefore that the convictions did not 
raise due process concerns); United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 112 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that 
a conviction under Pinkerton did not “run afoul of possible due process limitations”); United States v. 
Moreno, 588 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1979) (acknowledging that “vicarious guilt may have due process 
limitations,” but upholding the conviction because the co-conspirators’ act was not “so attenuated as to 
give [the court] due process concerns”); Kreit, supra note 142, at 603–04. 
 150. United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 850 (11th Cir. 1985); see Noferi, supra note 144, at 130. 
 151. Alvarez, 755 F.2d at 838–39. 
 152. Id. at 83940. 
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conspiracy, such as drug possession during a drug-trafficking conspiracy, 
and crimes which facilitate the achievement of a conspiracy’s goals, such 
as firearm possession during a drug-trafficking conspiracy.153 The third, 
however, was not a common basis for Pinkerton liability: crimes that, 
though reasonably foreseeable, are an unintended consequence of the 
conspiracy.154 The court observed that convictions of unintended crimes 
under Pinkerton, though technically consistent with the doctrine, may 
offend due process.155 The court upheld the convictions in Alvarez, 
however, because the conspirators were “more than ‘minor’ participants 
in the drug conspiracy,” and the murder was “not so attenuated as to run 
afoul of the potential due process limitations on the Pinkerton 
doctrine.”156 The Tenth Circuit subsequently held that due process 
constrained Pinkerton liability in declining to extend it to a first-degree 
murder that was not an object of the conspiracy.157 
The Ninth Circuit recognized another due process boundary cutting 
across Pinkerton liability: a defendant’s conviction of a substantive 
offense under Pinkerton offends due process if the offense was not 
reasonably foreseeable to that defendant based on her own involvement 
in the conspiracy.158 In United States v. Castaneda, the defendant was 
convicted of seven counts of using a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) on 
a Pinkerton liability theory.159 The predicate offense supporting one 
count was the drug conspiracy at the heart of the prosecution, and that 
for the other six was possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute.160 The only piece of evidence connecting the defendant to the 
drug conspiracy was six recorded phone calls.161 In one call, while 
engaging in small talk with a customer of the operation, the defendant 
relayed remarks by her husband about an intended drug transaction.162 
In others, the defendant merely related information about difficulties her 
husband and other conspirators had encountered.163 The Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged that firearm possession is generally reasonably foreseeable 
in a drug distribution conspiracy, but found that this “drugs-guns nexus” did 
not apply where a conspirator’s involvement in the conspiracy is so 
 
 153. Id. at 850 n.24 (citing United States v. Luis-Gonzalez, 719 F.2d 1539, 1545 n.4 (11th Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Brant, 448 F. Supp. 781, 782 (W.D. Pa. 1978)). 
 154. Id. at 850. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 850–51. 
 157. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 818 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 158. United States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 768 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 159. Id. at 764. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 767. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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minor that firearm possession was not foreseeable to that conspirator.164 
According to the court, the defendant was a “paradigm example” of such 
minor involvement, and therefore her convictions violated due process.165 
In the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits, then, a conspirator must play 
more than a minor role in the conspiracy in order to be held vicariously 
liable for the substantive crimes of co-conspirators. The bounds of this 
due process limit are somewhat different between the two circuits. In the 
Eleventh, a minor participant avoids liability only if her co-conspirators’ 
substantive crime resulted from an unexpected contingency, while the 
Ninth Circuit asks whether imputing liability to her would be fair in light 
of the nature of her participation. In other words, the Eleventh Circuit’s 
approach focuses on the nature of the substantive crime, while the Ninth 
Circuit focuses on the nature of the defendant’s conduct. These small 
differences are variations on a common principle: Even where Pinkerton 
is satisfied, the due process clause limits the degree to which a minor 
participant in a conspiracy may be deemed culpable for her co-
conspirators’ substantive crimes. 
D.  The Due Process Concerns That Constrain PINKERTON 
Substantive Liability Should Constrain Application of the 
CHERRY Rule as Well 
Because it imports Pinkerton vicarious liability wholesale, the 
criticisms that courts and commentators have leveled at Pinkerton apply 
equally to the Cherry rule. The wrongful conduct of the defendant’s co-
conspirator is attributed to the defendant where that conduct is merely 
reasonably foreseeable, regardless of whether it was an unintended 
consequence of the unlawful agreement.166 This extremely broad standard 
could permit prosecutors to introduce otherwise inadmissible and highly 
damaging declarations against the defendant even where the defendant 
played no role in the wrongful conduct that rendered the declarant 
unavailable. The Cherry rule therefore gives rise to the same “dangers 
for abuse” the dissenting justices described in Pinkerton.167 
The breadth of the Cherry rule also leads to the same proportionality 
concerns that underlie Pinkerton co-conspirator liability. Like Pinkerton, 
the Cherry rule rests on mere reasonable foreseeability, the hallmark of 
ordinary civil negligence. To be sure, forfeiture of the protections of the 
Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule is not as severe a 
consequence as the loss of liberty that may follow a conviction under 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Though the Tenth Circuit declined to expand Pinkerton substantive liability to unexpected 
first-degree murders, it did not exclude unexpected efforts to silence witnesses from its application of 
Pinkerton to Rule 804(b)(6). United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 818 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 167. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 650–52 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part). 
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Pinkerton. Forfeiture is nonetheless a punishment, imposed with the 
aims of stripping a wrongdoer of the benefits of her wrongdoing and 
deterring future wrongful conduct.168 Denying a defendant important 
trial rights based on conduct with regard to which she was merely negligent 
stretches the forfeiture rule’s equitable rationale to an uncomfortable 
degree, as a defendant cannot consciously take advantage of wrongful 
conduct of which she is unaware. The Cherry rule also does not mesh 
well with the forfeiture doctrine’s deterrent aim, as punishments have 
little value in deterring negligence.169 
Like Pinkerton co-conspirator liability in general, then, the Cherry 
rule risks holding minor participants accountable for conduct that is 
culpable to a degree well out of proportion to their own minimal 
involvement. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Alvarez, for 
example, introducing a murdered witness’s statements against, say, minor 
participants in a drug trafficking conspiracy who were neither involved in 
nor aware of the killing would offend due process. In such a case, the 
wrongful conduct that rendered the witness unavailable would be too far 
attenuated from the object of the conspiracy to be fairly attributed to 
conspirators who played only a minimal role.170 The Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Castaneda may also be easily translated to the Cherry 
context. Where a minor participant in a conspiracy could not reasonably 
foresee a co-conspirator’s wrongful action to silence a witness in light of 
her role, attributing that co-conspirator’s conduct to her for forfeiture 
purposes is inconsistent with due process. Where a co-conspirator’s 
action against a witness is too attenuated from the defendant, whether in 
light of the object of the conspiracy or the defendant’s role in it, 
conviction under Pinkerton and forfeiture of hearsay and confrontation 
objections under Cherry deprive the defendant of due process in the same 
manner. Federal courts should apply the due process limits identified in 
Alvarez and Castaneda in the Cherry context, and ensure that minor players 
will not suffer dire evidentiary consequences based on misconduct of 
which they were unaware and over which they had no control. 
 
 168. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 366 (2008) (noting that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing 
rule rests on the principle that “no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his wrong”) (citing 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159 (1878)); United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 962 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (noting that the forfeiture rule is intended “to deter criminals from intimidating or ‘taking 
care of’ potential witnesses against them”). 
 169. Cf. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (holding that Fourth Amendment 
violations resulting from simple negligence are not “sufficiently deliberate that [the exclusionary rule] 
can meaningfully deter” them). But see id. at 153 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
imposition of consequences for negligent behavior encourages greater care). 
 170. Cf. United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 85051 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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Conclusion 
The Cherry rule, like the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine in 
general, is aimed at “abhorrent behavior ‘which strikes at the heart of the 
system of justice itself.’”171 Presumably, most would agree that 
defendants should not be permitted to purchase a witness’s silence with 
violence or other wrongful conduct. But by imputing forfeiture of the 
confrontation right against every conspirator who should reasonably 
have foreseen that one among them would wrongfully silence a witness, 
the Cherry rule cuts too wide a swath. The rule should be abolished 
altogether, or, at the very least, limited in the manner that some circuit 
courts have limited Pinkerton. 
The Cherry rule is incompatible with the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. In Crawford, the Court tied 
the confrontation right to how common law courts understood it when 
the Sixth Amendment was ratified. At that time, it did not appear that 
those common law courts imputed forfeiture by wrongdoing among co-
conspirators. Commentators’ observations that few courts recognized 
vicarious liability for substantive crimes of co-conspirators before 
Pinkerton support this conclusion. Moreover, like the California forfeiture 
statute that the Court rejected in Giles, the Cherry rule premises 
forfeiture of a defendant’s confrontation right on a pretrial 
determination of guilt. The modern understanding of the confrontation 
right leaves no place for the Cherry rule. For that reason, district and 
circuit courts presented with a choice of whether to adopt the Cherry 
rule should reject it, and the rest should overturn the opinions that have 
adopted it. 
Even if the Cherry rule can coexist peacefully with the Confrontation 
Clause, due process concerns restrain its application short of the logical 
extent of Pinkerton. The courts of appeals have identified two due 
process limits on the scope of Pinkerton liability that should apply to 
Cherry as well. In Alvarez, the Eleventh Circuit observed that convictions 
under Pinkerton of minor conspirators for substantive crimes that were 
an unintended consequence of the conspiracy and attenuated from its 
objective violate due process. In Castaneda, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that due process requires courts to measure the foreseeability of co-
conspirators’ substantive crimes by the extent of the defendant’s own 
participation, and not by the overarching objective of the conspiracy 
itself. Courts that have adopted the Cherry rule should observe these due 
process limits, and determine whether the extent and character of a 
conspirator’s participation in the conspiracy is sufficient to justify holding 
 
 171. Fed. R. Evid. 804 advisory committee’s note (1997) (quoting United States v. Mastrangelo, 
693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
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her accountable for her co-conspirator’s wrongful conduct against a 
witness. 
